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Markets Segmented by Regional-Origin Labelling with Quality 
Control
1 Introduction
The protection of the regional origin of foods is a major part of the EU’s quality 
policy in agriculture. According to Council Regulation No. 2081/1992, "the 
promotion of products having certain characteristics could be of considerable benefit 
to the rural economy, in particular to less-favored or remote areas, by improving the 
incomes of farmers and by retaining the rural population in these areas" (Commission 
of the EU 1992). When the guidelines for State aid for advertising of products were 
established in 2001 (Commission of the EU 2001), only the promotion of those 
agricultural products can b  supported which are protected designations of origin 
(PDO) as outlined in Council Regulation No. 2081/92 (Art. 2, Council Regulation 
No. 2081/1992)1. This decision implies that regional-origin labelling has to be 
associated with a quality-control system that leads to a superior quality, if the 
program is to be subsidised by the government. 
Generic promotion of agricultural products by EU member countries as well as 
regional marketing initiatives by federal states in line with these regulations have 
been widespread for years. However, despite the high – and possibly increasing –
value the EU addresses to the promotion of regional products, analytical work on the 
economic impacts of those initiatives is lacking. While the economic importance of 
regional-origin labelled products in consumer demand has been confirmed [BALLING
1
 There are two kinds of regional origin that are registered and protected under Council Regulation 
No. 2081/1992: (i) Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) and (ii) Protected Geographical Indication 
(PGI). Under the first definition - being more advanced - foodstuffs have to be produced, processed 
and prepared in the designated region. A causal link has to be proven to exist between the regional 
origin and the quality, which has to be "essentially or exclusively due to a particular geographical 
environment with its inherent natural and human factors" (Art. 2, Council Regulation No. 2081/1992). 
The PGI covers a product where at least one of the stages – production, processing, or preparation –
occurs in the designated area. In a somewhat weaker formulation than for PDOs, quality, reputation or 
other characteristics are "attributable to that geographical origin" (ibid., Art. 2) for a PGI.
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2000, WIRTHGEN 2005], the question under which conditions the generic promotion 
of regional-origin labelling results in a significant price mark-up for farmers remains 
largely unanswered. As the second pillar of the EU’s CAP aims at strengthening the 
development of rural areas and providing farmers with diversified opportunities for 
the marketing of quality products, supporting regional promotion measures of 
produce from remote locations that feature quality-control systems could be of added 
significance. Given this background, it is the objective of this paper to provide a 
methodological framework for the analysis of regional marketing programs which 
include regional-origin labelling as well as quality assurance and control. An 
equilibrium-displacement model (EDM) for a segmented market with differential 
qualities is developed that extends most of the existing approaches in the generic 
advertising and country-of-origin literature. We investigate the extent to which a 
phased reduction of initial governmental support levels impacts farmer price 
premiums and welfare. It could be argued that with increasing producer cost shares 
for program participation farmers lack the incentive to participate in regional 
marketing activities that meet a growing consumer demand for high-quality foods 
from designated regional origins. Results suggest that full governmental support to 
regional-marketing programs provide significant price mark-ups at the farm level. 
Our framework can be applied to a variety of regional marketing programs. An 
empirical application of the model is illustrated for a selected European case, i.e. 
"Certified Quality – Bavaria". 
 
2 Review of Literature
There is a well-established literature on the economics of generic promotion, starting 
from classical and general contributions (NERLOVE/WAUGH 1961, FORKER/WARD
1993) to recent and detailed impact analyses applied to selected questions, 
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commodities and programs (see the contributions in KAISER 2003). Typically, the 
economic effects of generic advertising on food demand are statistically modelled 
and the redistributive and welfare impacts elaborated. Especially for the U.S., where 
generic advertising is financed by producer levies, cost-benefit ratios are calculated 
which relate additional revenues and costs for producers due to program 
participation. Studies have investigated the importance of cross-price effects for 
advertising effectiveness (KINNUCAN 1996, KINNUCAN/XIAO/HSIA 1996), the 
distribution of impacts of advertising within the marketing chain (KAISER/SCHMIT
2003) and across interrelated markets (KINNUCAN/MIAO 2000). ZHANG and SEXTON
(2002) analyse the implications of market power for the allocative and redistributive 
effects of generic promotion. Economic studies on European regional promotion 
programs are rare, but some do exist for Germany (e.g., HOFF/CLAES 1997,
HERRMANN/THOMPSON/KRISCHIK-BAUTZ 2002).
A broad literature on the economics of food labeling has developed in recent years 
much of which is surveyed in GOLAN/KUCHLER/MITCHELL (2001). This general 
literature is related to the theory of food labeling and the role of government in the 
labelling process. Within this field, regional-origin labelling and especially 
geographical indications have gained increasing attention among economists as a 
number of studies reveal high and increasing consumer appreciation for labels of 
origin in Europe and the U.S. (LUSK et al. 2006, ROOSEN/LUSK/FOX 2003). 
In this context a growing literature has focused on the economic impacts of the 
country of origin applying models of segmented agricultural markets to measure the 
welfare and market effects of origin labelling (BRESTER/MARSH/ATWOOD 2004). The 
country-of-origin labelling (COOL) provision of the 2002 U.S. Farm Sector and 
Rural Investment Act requires from September 30, 2004 that retailers label the 
country of origin on fresh and frozen foods. CHUNG, ZHANG and PEEL (2004) review 
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studies that have assessed market level costs and welfare effects of introducing 
COOL in the U.S. meat industry. LUSK and ANDERSON (2004) adapt a WOHLGENANT
(1993) equilibrium-displacement model specification of vertically segmented 
markets to simulate producer and consumer welfare effects of COOL in the U.S. 
meat industry. Their results reveal that demand increases of two to three percent are 
sufficient to offset additional costs at the producer level. 
Moreover, an extensive literature has investigated the effects of the country of origin 
as a signal of quality to consumers. BECKER (2002) notes that the regional origin is 
becoming one of the most important determinants of food demand in the EU. VAN 
DER LANS et al. (2001) and VERLEGH and STEENKAMP (1999), in a meta-analysis of 
country-of-origin studies, found origin labels to be a significant factor in consumer 
product evaluations. Recently, LUSK et al. (2006) differentiate between consumer 
motivations for origin labels from the economic and marketing literature to 
investigate the reasons behind "why" consumers want COOL and derive causes for 
public policy in the U.S. 
Despite the numerous extensions in the generic promotion and origin-labelling 
literature, analyses were mainly carried out within models where one uniform price 
or cost measure at one stage of the marketing chain is determined. In the case of a 
regional marketing program that includes regional-origin labelling and additional 
costs for quality control, as is the case under the EU Council Regulation 2081/1992, 
different qualities have to be distinguished. Market segmentation occurs between a 
higher-quality market for the origin-labelled product and an average-quality residual 
market segment. However, a segmented-market approach that considers the 
regulations for governmental support of regional origin-labelling set by Council 
Regulation No. 2081/92 has not yet been developed. For this reason, a flexible 
approach to evaluating the price and welfare effects of state-financed regional-origin 
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marketing programs including quality differentiated products and quality-assurance 
systems is developed below.
3 The Model 
The EDM methodology was originally proposed by MUTH (1964) and reviewed by 
PIGGOTT (1992) and ALSTON, NORTON and PARDEY (1995). The objective of the 
EDM approach applied in this study is to model the producer price and welfare 
effects and their implications for state-financed regional-origin programs of quality-
differentiated products and regionally segmented markets. 
In our general model each region can produce for a uniform standard-quality market 
which we call the "mass" market. Each region can also incur additional program 
participation costs and produce for a high-quality market which is regionally 
labelled. The demand for these high quality regional products may be augmented by 
regional promotion expenditures borne within and outside the region. 
As stated earlier, a linkage between improved product quality and regional-origin 
labelling is a justification for government-subsidised promotion efforts. So, we seek a 
model that will enable us to evaluate promotional programs designed to send quality 
signals based on regional origin. However, as shown by KINNUCAN (1996), when 
markets are interrelated, ignoring the cross-price and cross-advertising effects will 
yield biased measures of advertising effectiveness. Hence, the model explicitly 
accounts for various cross-price and cross-advertising elasticities. Given the nature of 
regional-origin labelling, the assumption of perfect product substitutability between 
"mass" and labeled products from different regions is resolved in favor of a more 
realistic assumption of differentiated products based on their regional origin and 
quality. 
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We extend the existing work and present a general model which allows for 
interactions between "mass" and regional-origin markets with respect to price, 
regional advertising, supply response and differing cost structures. 
3.1 Structure of the Model
A multi-equation market-equilibrium model for two regions engaged in regional-
origin labelling which are related in price, advertising and costs is specified as
Supply: ( )Z,C,PijSijS = (1)
Demand: ( )X,A,PijDijD = (2)
Market Equilibrium: ijD
i
jS = , (3)
where i = region A or B; j = mass-market product M, high-quality product A or B; 
P is a vector of producer prices, A is a vector of regional advertising expenditures, 
C = additional producer cost of participation in the regional advertising program, and 
Z and X are exogenous supply and demand shifters. We assume competitive markets 
at the farm level. Prices and quantities are determined endogenously according to the 
market equilibrium (3).
We follow the general methods used by KINNUCAN and MYRLAND (2003) and 
PIGGOTT (2003), where dx/x=d lnx is the percentage change of any variable x. Then 
use of the logarithmic differential approximation to equations (1) – (3) yields the 
following multi-equation EDM where the parameters are interpreted as elasticities.
Region A
Supply: 
A
A
MAM
A
M
A
M PlndPlndSlnd  += (4)
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AClnd1APlnd
A
A
A
ASlnd  += (5)
Demand:
MPlnd
A
M
A
MDlnd = (6)
A
BAlnd
A
ABeAAlnd
A
AAeMPlnd
A
AMBPlnd
A
ABAPlnd
A
A
A
ADlnd ++++=  (7)
AAlnd
A
BAe
A
BAlnd
A
BBeMPlnd
A
BMAPlnd
A
BABPlnd
A
B
A
BDlnd ++++=  (8)
Region B
Supply:
B
B
MBM
B
M
B
M PlndPlndSlnd  += (9)
BClnd2BPlnd
B
B
B
BSlnd  += (10)
Demand: 
MPlnd
B
M
B
MDlnd = (11)
B
AAlnd
B
BAeBAlnd
B
BBeMPlnd
B
BMAPlnd
B
BABPlnd
B
B
B
BDlnd ++++=  (12)
BAlnd
B
ABe
B
AAlnd
B
AAeMPlnd
B
AMAPlnd
B
ABBPlnd
B
A
B
ADlnd ++++=  (13)
Equilibrium Conditions
? ? iMDlndDiMhiMSlndSiMh = (14)
B
ADlnd
DB
Ah
A
ADlnd
DA
Ah
A
ASlnd += (15)
A
BDlnd
DA
Bh
B
BDlnd
DB
Bh
B
BSlnd += (16)
Superscripts denote the region (A or B), subscripts denote products (mass-quality 
product M, high-quality product A, or high-quality labelled product B), ’s are own-
and cross-price elasticities of supply; ’s are own- and cross-price elasticities of 
demand, e’s are the own- and cross-advertising elasticities, and C’s represent the 
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(17)
to
(19)
marginal cost of participation for each region2. Equilibrium conditions (14) - (16) 
contain both supply and demand market shares Sijh  and Dijh , respectively
3
. For 
instance DAAh ( DBAh ) is the market share of the total demand for high-quality product 
A within region A (B). 
As we start from the idea of regional-origin labelling with quality control, this 
implies vertical product differentiation. Thus, the demand functions of model (4) to 
(16) do not include a substitutive relationship between the two quality levels. 
Substitution effects occur at one given quality level only, i.e. between qualities A and 
B but not between either A or B as opposed to M (KINNUCAN/XIAO/HSIA 1996). 
There also is substitution on the supply side between the two different qualities. A 
rising price in the high-quality market leads to a reduction of supply on the low-
quality market ),( BMBAMA 00 <<  .
Given exogenous market shares, advertising quantities, and program-participation 
cost, the linear equation system (14) - (16) can be solved for the three endogenous 
price-change variables d ln Pj as,
		




		
		







		
		







+
		
		
		








		
		







		
		







=
		
		
	








B
BClnd
A
AClnd
32c31c
12c11c
1
33a31a
13a11a
B
BAlnd
B
AAlnd
A
BAlnd
A
AAlnd
34b31b
14b11b
1
33a31a
13a11a
BPlnd
APlnd
MPlnd
MM
L
MM
L
L
MM
L
L
MM
L
--
where the a matrix includes own- and cross-price elasticities of supply and demand 
as well as market shares, the b matrix captures own- and cross-advertising 
elasticities, and the c matrix includes parameters associated with the added cost of 
regional program participation. 
2
 We assume the components of X and Z are subsumed in the constant terms of equations (1) and (2).
3
 If for supply, BMS
A
MSS += , then SBMhBMSlndSAMhAMSlndSlnd += , where SAh  and SBh  are supply 
shares on the mass market originating from region A and B, respectively. This same relationship holds 
for markets segmented on the demand side.
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Parameterisation of the above model is needed to simulate how changes in own- and 
cross-region advertising expenditures and changes in program participation cost 
affect market prices, quantities and producer welfare. Empirical illustrations will 
likely necessitate restrictions to the general model to characterise the unique 
dimensions of any particular empirical application.
The solution to equation (17) can be used to evaluate the total and distribution of 
changes in producer welfare due to regional advertising. This can be accomplished 
by computing changes in producer surplus (PS) in each market, assuming parallel 
shifts in demand and supply. 
????
i j
i
jSlnd5.01
i
jPlnd
i
jS
i
jp
i j
i
jPS 	


 

 += . (20)
3.2 Possible Model Uses 
The model presented above has been designed for a combined analysis of regional-
origin labelling and quality control. Accordingly, the implications of promotion 
expenditures for the labelled products can be elaborated as well as the consequences 
of increasing producer costs due to the instruments of quality control. The model 
allows for the general situation where competing high-quality products exist as well 
as a common non-competing lower-quality mass product. This is typical for the 
current situation in the EU where different regional labels have been introduced, e.g., 
for beef, advertising occurs for competing labels. A crucial task in the empirical 
application of the model is to define precisely (i) the competing high-quality products 
and (ii) the relevant market on which the products compete.
If strong competition between high-quality segments of the market does not exist, it 
would be necessary to restrict the model to distinguish only one regional label from 
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the lower-quality market, but perhaps also allow for the possibility of trade between 
markets. Other problem-specific restrictions can be easily imposed.
The general model may serve other purposes as well. The EDM model could be 
applied to other relevant issues where market segmentation plays a major role. Cases 
in point are strategies of country-of-origin labelling, differentiation of ecological as 
opposed to conventional farming and foods, or the labelling of foods that do not 
contain genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Some modelling approaches of 
these markets have already been provided. CHUNG, ZHANG and PEEL (2004), LUSK
and ANDERSON (2004) and KINNUCAN and MYRLAND (2005) distinguish between 
domestic and foreign product market segments in EDMs of vertical supply chains. 
However, their empirical models do not include cross-price effects between the 
labelled products. Products from ecological as opposed to conventional farming are 
analysed in a segmented equilibrium-displacement model by HAGNER (1997) and the 
impacts of governmental policies on the conventional and ecological markets are 
elaborated. MOSS, SCHMITZ and SCHMITZ (2004) use a partial-equilibrium 
segregation model in their study of how resistance to the introduction of genetically 
modified (GM) crops leads to segregated markets for GM and non-GM crops. Based 
on this model, they illustrate the welfare implications of market segregation and the 
relevance of segregation costs. To our knowledge the studies of JAMES and ALSTON
(2002) and LUSK and NORWOOD (2005) are the only applications of EDMs that 
explicitly incorporate differentiated product qualities. 
Our model differs from these approaches in the literature in two major respects:
1. The modelling framework is applied to regional-origin labelling. None of the 
other modelling approaches has been used to study this issue.
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2. Although individual papers go further in other respects than we do, none of the 
segmented-market models in the literature cover competition between high-
quality products as does our model with labelled goods of regions A and B.
We now provide an application of the model to a regional-labelling and quality-
control scheme. The case study is related to the German program "Certified Quality –
Bavaria".
4 An Empirical Application 
4.1 Background
The origin of Bavarian regional-origin labelling dates back to 1985 when the 
program "Quality from Bavaria" was established by the Bavarian Ministry for 
Nutrition, Agriculture and Forestry (for details, see 
HERRMANN/THOMPSON/KRISCHIK-BAUTZ 2002). After first used only for seed 
products and breeding cattle, a program for fed beef was introduced in October 1994, 
largely influenced by consumer concerns about BSE. To "re-establish and increase 
confidence of the strongly insecure consumer especially in Bavarian meat" was the 
declared objective of this program (BSTMELF 1999, p. 10). Advertising for the 
program occurred in various media and the Bavarian meat-controlling institution, 
"Bayerische Fleischpruefung e.V.", was responsible for quality and test regulations. 
Activities under the program were suspended in late 2000 when BSE cases were 
discovered in Germany.
In accordance with the EU rules on protected designations of origin, a revised 
program was then started in February 2002: "Certified Quality – Bavaria" 
(BSTMELF 2002). Participation in the program was open to producers, processors 
and retailers who agreed to a detailed system of quality control. This requirement is 
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binding since the regional label may only be EU-supported when a superior quality is 
guaranteed.
4.2 The Bavarian Beef Market
The general model is specified to characterise the "Certified Quality – Bavaria" 
program. The model structure consists of two regions (Bavaria and Rest of Germany 
– ROG), a single high-quality product (produced in Bavaria but sold in both regions) 
and a common mass-market product (produced in both regions).
Bavaria (Region A)
Supply: 
A
A
MAM
A
M
A
M PlndPlndSlnd  += (21)
AClnd1APlnd
A
A
A
ASlnd  += (22)
Demand:
MPlnd
A
M
A
MDlnd = (23)
AAlnd
A
AAeMPlnd
A
AMAPlnd
A
A
A
ADlnd ++=  (24)
Rest of Germany (Region B)
Supply:
MPlnd
B
M
B
MSlnd = (25)
Demand: 
MPlnd
B
M
B
MDlnd = (26)
B
AAlnd
B
AAeMPlnd
B
AMAPlnd
B
A
B
ADlnd ++=  (27)
Equilibrium Conditions:
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 = MDlndDMhMSlndSMh (28)
B
ADlnd
DB
Ah
A
ADlnd
DA
Ah
A
ASlnd += (29)
Again, superscripts characterise regions A and B, and subscripts the high-quality 
product A and the mass product M. Bavaria is the largest exporter of beef among all 
German federal states. Bavarian exports occur both under the regional label and for 
unlabelled beef, i.e. for the high-quality and the mass market. Therefore, there is 
demand for Bavarian beef in the rest of Germany for both qualities (equations (26) 
and (27)). As exports from the region go to various regional markets in Germany, 
Bavarian beef competes with beef under various other labels as well as foreign beef. 
There is no single competitor of regionally-labelled Bavarian beef in the high-quality 
market sector. Thus, we posit that the labelled product is of superior quality to that of 
the mass market. We distinguish only the regional label as the high-quality beef 
product from the mass (lower-quality) beef product.
In the Bavarian case, the high-quality price (PA) is what wholesalers pay producers; it 
does not include deductions for advertising. The producer contribution to advertising 
is a cost which must be deducted from PA to obtain a net producer price PP. We 
derive Pp from equation (5)
AClnd1APlnd
A
A
A
ASlnd  += ,
where
AClnd1 AC/AdC)AAS/AC)(AC/AAS( = (30)
)AAS/
A
AS(=
= .
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Here  is the relative horizontal shift in the high-quality supply curve due to the 
added cost of producing high-quality beef. Substituting (30) into (5) yields
KAASlnd)A
A
1(APlnd = 
, (31)
where A
A
K 
= is the relative vertical shift in the price direction. Further, the change 
in producer price (PP) is defined when K = 0 as
A
ASlnd)A
A
1(PPlnd 
= (32)
and the level of the producer price is given as
)1PPlnd(MPPP += . (33)
The logic of our comparative-static analysis can be followed by referring to Figure 1. 
With no advertising (and presumably no higher-quality product) we begin with the 
high-quality market-equilibrium point .Q)P(P 0A0P0A and=  Advertising expenditures 
shift demand outwardly to D1 with a new equilibrium point .Q)P(P 1A1P1A and=  With 
advertising cost fully provided by the government, the producer price )( 1PP exactly 
equals the wholesale price )( 1AP and positive producer-welfare gains are realised. 
However, with producer contributions to the cost of advertising, the supply-function 
shifts to S1 yielding the new equilibrium point at quantity |Q| A2 corresponding to 
wholesale and producer prices of |P| A2  and |P| P2 , respectively. At this point, 
= 22 PA PP (or producer cost). Supply could shift leftward as producer costs ( ) 
increase to such a degree that the welfare gains to producers become negative. In 
terms of our model the quantity and price changes are AASlnd , APlnd  and PPlnd .
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Figure 1: High-Quality Beef Market
4.3 Parameterisation 
Not all parameters of the empirical model are readily available. Nor do we have 
complete information on the market segments of labelled and non-labelled products 
as well as reliable price data in the market segments or the additional producer costs 
due to participation in a program that combines quality standards and control with 
regional-origin labelling. However, there is much we do know. For instance, we have 
good statistical estimates of the responsiveness of labelled-product sales to 
advertising effort. Given this somewhat limited knowledge, simulations and 
sensitivity analyses are particularly important. Simulations can also be used to 
illustrate stronger changes of policy than those realised in the past. This is crucial 
when one is interested in the amount of additional advertising expenditures necessary 
to induce a defined price difference between the labelled and the non-labelled 
market.
Table 1 provides the parameters and elasticities of the empirical model. A key 
parameter of the model for evaluating the impacts of advertising for a regional-origin 
label is the advertising elasticity of demand. We take the econometric estimate of 
0.04 by HERRMANN, THOMPSON and KRISCHIK/BAUTZ (2002) measured for the 
program "Quality from Bavaria". It is consistent with most studies from the generic-
promotion literature that the advertising elasticity of demand is significantly positive 
but typically less than 0.1. In this same study, econometric estimates of the own-price 
elasticities of demand (-0.8 in the high-quality segment and -0.4 on the "mass"
market) were found to be consistent with other estimates for beef demand in 
Germany. With respect to the importance of cross-price effects on the welfare 
implications of regional-origin promotion, the cross-price elasticity of demand 
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between high quality and "mass" quality beef is 0.1. Some recent econometric studies 
based on demand systems indicate that our price and cross-price elasticities might be 
at the lower end, suggesting that the price elasticity of demand for beef has increased 
over time and might now be above unity (WILDNER 2000). 
Market simulation results can be particularly sensitive to both the advertising 
elasticities as well as the marginal cost of participation parameter. Given an 
advertising elasticity of 0.04 in both markets, we focus attention over the sensitivity 
of the market impacts of the cost parameter ( ). The price and quantity change 
effects are extended to producer welfare effects in each market segment. 
Table 1: Parameters and Elasticities of the Empirical Model
4.4 Simulations
Our benchmark simulations are based on actual segmented-market data for the year 
2003. At that time, the mass-quality price (PM) averaged € 2.31. While high-quality 
certified Bavarian product price premium over the mass-market product varied 
considerably, the premium achieved could be as much as ten percent. In Bavaria, the 
annual production of labelled and mass market beef was 107,608 and 161,413 
million kgs., respectively. We assume that there exists no competing regional-quality 
label in any state of ROG. In the ROG, no high-quality labelled beef was produced. 
However, the production of mass-market beef was 1,160,523 kgs. Thus, the market 
shares of mass-market beef produced in Bavaria and ROG were 12 and 88 percent, 
respectively. Our benchmark assumes the existence of an ongoing promotion 
program in Bavaria which implies that the producer cost of participation are included 
in the existing supply function for the labelled product. Thus, shifts in the supply 
function are due to producer contributions associated with promotional labelling. In 
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our simulations from the baseline, we explore the effects of a 100 percent increase in 
the promotional expenditures for Bavarian quality-labelled beef. 
In Table 2 we show how increased regional quality advertising affects prices and 
quantities in the segmented markets and how these change as producers share the 
cost of advertising with the government. Suppose the situation is that the regional 
labelling of "Certified Quality – Bavaria" is subsidised by 100 percent governmental
payments ( = 0). This is especially likely for the year 2003 where the regional 
quality label was revised by the EU commission and launched on the market4. Since 
that time, governmental support was scheduled to be reduced by 10% per year. 
Table 2: Price and Quantity Effects of Increased Advertising of High-Quality 
Bavarian Beef
The simulated advertising-induced outward demand shift increases both the 
wholesale price of Bavarian beef (PA) and the producer price (PP). Market 
interrelationships reveal that advertising Bavarian beef has a positive influence on the 
mass-market price. When the cost parameter   = 0, all costs associated with the 
advertising-induced demand shift are borne by the government. In this situation, both 
the wholesale and producer price in the high-quality Bavarian market increase by 4.1 
percent over the mass-market price. The positive supply response of the high-quality 
Bavarian product shifts the mass-market supply leftward in Bavaria, while the 
marginally higher PM encourages a small positive supply response in the ROG mass 
market.
4
  Annual Bavarian advertising expenditure on “Certified Quality – Bavaria” for beef was 0.5 million 
Euro in 2003. Total program expenditures of the state of Bavaria in 2003 were € 2.556 million, which 
includes advertising expenditures for other products and program costs.
Page 17 of 27
Editorial Office, Dept of Economics, Warwick University, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK
Submitted Manuscript
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
18
Notwithstanding increased wholesale prices for the Bavarian high-quality product, as 
producers are asked to share in the cost of advertising (  increases), net producer 
price falls as the cost-induced supply function shifts leftward. Producer contributions 
act as a wedge between wholesale and producer prices. This wedge can increase until 
the added advertising cost exactly equals the benefits. This breakeven point is where 
the benefit-cost parameter || = 1.0 and the increase in PA is 8.0 percent. Different 
changes in PA and PP are observed as the breakeven point () moves "up or down" in 
Table 2.
Changes in producer surplus (PS) associated with the promotion of "Certified Quality 
– Bavaria" are shown in Table 3. Clearly, the overall change in producer surplus is 
greatest when the demand shift is entirely government subsidised 
(  = 0). However, for the profit-maximising producer, it makes sense to share in the 
cost of advertising because positive changes in PS continue as producers contribute 
up to a breakeven point, again where  = 1.0; that is, where the change in producer 
surplus is zero. Also, producers are expected to contribute as scheduled government 
subsidies decrease.  The breakeven point increases when the advertising contribution 
of the Bavarian producers rises. 
Table 3: Changes in Producer Surplus due to Increased Advertising of High-
Quality Bavarian Beef (millions of €)
Welfare changes among markets also occur. Advertising of the Bavarian high-quality 
product in both regions (Bavaria and ROG) results in positive welfare changes in all 
markets and regions. Even the ROG gains from Bavarian advertising albeit small. In 
fact, due to substitutability in supply, the mass-market welfare gain in ROG is 
relatively greater than that in the Bavarian mass market. Since the absolute sizes of 
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the markets differ we calculated producer-surplus changes per beef farmer. For the 
participants of "Certified Quality – Bavaria" the actual number of participating beef 
producers in 2003 is used to calculate PS of "label members". Of course, the change 
in PS is greatest in the "no cost" situation, where 0= . The last column in Table 3 
shows the sum of the high-quality and mass-market effects for Bavaria. On a per-
farm basis clear gains to advertising are seen even as producers share in the cost of 
advertising. Note that these are changes in producer surplus, so it is profitable for 
producers to contribute to the advertising effort up to the point where .0=PS
5 Concluding Remarks
Quality signals of regionally produced products can be economically beneficial to 
producers. The benefits accrued are directly related to the effectiveness to which the 
demand for the high-quality product can be augmented with advertising, the cost 
associated with the advertising effort and, of course, the basic economic structural 
characteristics of the market segments under study.
Policy conclusions arise from the analysis. Quality control for regional products and 
regional-origin labelling are supposed to raise the income of farmers in rural areas 
and, thus, contribute to rural development. A pre-condition is that the income effect 
of rising demand outweighs that of increasing costs due to participation in the new 
programme. These results are based on computed benefit-cost ratios of regional-
origin labelling from the producers’ point of view. Additional analyses are needed as 
to whether policies are successful under an extended regional objective function that 
includes changes in consumer surplus and additional regional expenditures for the 
labelling scheme. More research is necessary, too, regarding the aggregate 
assessment of regional-origin labelling from the federal or national point of view.
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In this paper we suggest a general economic framework that can be used to examine 
problems of this nature. We illustrate this framework with an empirical examination 
of the "Certified Quality - Bavaria" promotion program. This illustration includes 
two regions, Bavaria and Rest of Germany (ROG), both of which produce beef for 
the mass-market but only Bavaria produces the higher quality-labelled product of 
pure guaranteed Bavarian origin. We allow for trade in both products between 
regions.
The promotion of the Bavarian labelled product in Bavaria positively influences both 
regions and products. All market segments can gain. While clearly producer gains are 
great when the cost of the advertising the Bavarian labelled product is financed 
entirely by the government, it remains rational for profit-maximising producers to co-
finance contributions as well.
We found our proposed analytical framework to be a flexible and easy-to-use tool to 
simulate market behaviour in response to promoting the Bavarian quality-labelled 
product. We believe it is generally applicable to examine a number of policy-related 
issues in segmented commodity markets.
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Figure 1: High-Quality Beef Market
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